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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20061090-CA 
URIEL CHAVEZ-ESPINOZA, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of one count of aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony; one count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony; and three counts 
of simple assault, a class A misdemeanor, in the Fourth Judicial District, Wasatch 
County, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the guilty verdict on aggravated burglary inconsistent with another verdict, 
and, if so, does the inconsistency require a reversal? 
Standard of review. Where a defendant argues that a verdict of guilty on one 
count is inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on another count, the question on review 
is simply whether the evidence suffices to support the guilty verdict. State v. Stewart, 
729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986). 
2. Can defendant establish that the trial court plainly erred in giving a jury 
instruction where he affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection 
to it? Was trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the instruction below? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to the first question. "An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
3. Where defendant, without reason, failed to maintain contact with his trial 
counsel, was counsel ineffective for not more fully consulting with defendant in his 
preparations for trial? 
Standard of review. See standard for issue 2, above. 
4. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of 
the State's case? 
Standard of review. The grant or denial "of a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law [that] [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 17, 70 P.3d 111 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
5. Did the evidence regarding the aggravated burglary count suffice to support the 
jury's guilty verdict? 
Standard of review. When reviewing a jury verdict, an appellate court "review[s] 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,115, 63 P.3d 94. 
The court "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
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evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." Id. (citation omitted). 
6. Where a defendant does not demonstrate that a biased juror sat, can he prevail 
on his claims that the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying a motion to 
strike a juror for cause? 
Standard of review. "Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing such a ruling, [the appellate 
court] reverse[s] only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Finlayson, 956 
P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah App. 
1994)) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted). "If a defendant 
believes the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause, in order to preserve the 
error on appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is 
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause." Id. (quoting State v. 
Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997)). Moreover, "[e]ven if the trial court has 
erroneously granted or denied a challenge for cause, . . . to prevail on a claim of error . . . 
a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial 
or incompetent." Id. (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 400 (Utah 1994)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
7. Defendant claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Is this claim timely? 
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Standard of review. The timeliness of a challenge to the composition of a jury— 
whether to the venire or to the selected jury—is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ffi[ 11, 35, 140 P.3d 1219. 
8. Should the trial court have sua sponte granted a mistrial when, upon 
questioning by defense counsel, a witness stated that he was afraid because defendant had 
threatened his family members? 
Standard of review. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an 
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that 
the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, f 41, 82 P.3d 1106. 
9. Where defendant affirmatively approved the jury instructions, may he now 
argue that the trial court plainly erred for not instructing on a lesser included offense of 
trespassing? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this claim. 
10. Should this Court grant defendant's request that it reconsider its earlier denial 
of his rule 23B motion for remand, where defendant provides no legal or factual support 
for his request? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this claim. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004); one count of child abuse, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (West Supp. 2005); one 
count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (West 2004); and four counts of assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004). R15-17. In addition, the State charged him 
on all counts with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, subjecting him to 
criminal liability under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). Id. The State also 
charged defendant with committing all the offenses in concert with two or more persons, 
subjecting him to enhanced penalties for group criminal activity under the Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006), commonly known as the gang enhancement 
statute. Id. 
A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and 
three counts of assault. See Rl 65-69. The jury found that defendant acted in concert 
with two or more persons in committing all of these offenses. See id. The jury found 
defendant not guilty of child abuse and not guilty on one count of assault. On November 
17, 2006, the trial court imposed judgment, sentencing defendant to a prison term of 
9 years to life on the aggravated burglary count; a concurrent prison term of 1 to 15 years 
on the aggravated assault count; and concurrent jail terms of 60 days on each of the 
assault counts. Rl 88-89. 
Defendant timely appealed. R196. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime 
The victims in this case were Adrian Ramirez and his family members, including 
his brother Jorge Ramirez. See Rl 5-17; 165-69. The perpetrators were defendant, who 
was Adrian's cousin, and defendant's friends—Jorge Urias; Genaro Velasquez, also 
known as "Angel"; Miguel Flores, also know as "La Borrega" or "the sheep"; and 
another male known as "La Diabla." R204:26-29; State's Exhibit 2. 
On December 24, 2005, defendant arranged for his cousin, Adrian Ramirez, to 
purchase cocaine from defendant's friend, Jorge Urias. R204:13. Adrian purchased $20 
worth of cocaine on behalf of another cousin, Jose Luis Ramirez. R204:14; State's 
Exhibit 2. At some point, Jose Luis decided to return the cocaine "[b]ecause it did not 
work." R204:15. Jorge Urias returned Jose Luis's money. Id. The return of the cocaine 
resulted in the criminal episode for which defendant was charged. Id. 
On December 31, 2005, New Year's Eve, Adrian was at home with his brother, 
Jorge Ramirez, and Jose Luis. R204:18. Around 3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2006, Jorge 
Ramirez woke Adrian to tell him that defendant had just telephoned and was on the line. 
R204:19. When Adrian took the phone, defendant told Adrian that "[h]e was going to 
f us all." R204:20. When Adrian asked why, defendant said it was because the 
cocaine had been returned to Jorge Urias. Id. Defendant told Adrian to "Come over here 
to Park City so that I can f you and your brother." R204:21. Adrian told defendant 
that he "didn't want to fight with him." Id. Defendant became more angry, and Adrian 
hungup. R204:22. Adrian went back to bed. Id. 
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Sometime after 3:45 a.m., someone knocked on the door of Adrian's family's 
apartment. R204:23. When Adrian opened the door, defendant thrust his fist into the 
apartment and hit Adrian. R204:24-25. Defendant had four friends with him—Jorge 
Urias, "Angel," "La Borrega," and "La Diabla." R204:29; State's Exhibit 2. La Borrega 
stepped inside and pulled Adrian out of the apartment and into the hallway. R204:26-27; 
State's Exhibit 2. Jorge Urias, Angel, and La Diabla, all carrying broken bottles, entered 
the apartment and began fighting with Jorge Ramirez and Jose Luis. R204:105. 
After La Borrega pulled Adrian into the hallway, defendant hit Adrian on the face 
about seven times. R204:27-28. At some point, Adrian's brother Jorge Ramirez, his 
cousin Jose Luis, and defendant's friends came out the door, and "all of them [began] 
fighting." R204:30. Defendant's friends were also hitting Adrian. Id. Adrian broke 
away and "went running to the parking lot," where he hid underneath a truck. R204:30-
35. Back in the hallway, Angel used a bottle to cut Jorge Ramirez three times. 
R204:lll. 
Fiorina Chavez, Adrian's mother, stepped out into the hallway, trying to separate 
the fighters. R204:113. She said to defendant, "Go on home, son. What are you doing 
fighting? It's too late." Id. Then Ruben Ramirez, Adrian's father, stepped outside. 
R204:l 14. He "was able to separate [his] family from [defendant] and [defendant's] 
friends," R204:115. As he stepped back with his family, Jorge Urias was "waving the 
switchblade at [him]." Id. 
Ruben continued backing up, keeping his family behind him and holding his arms 
spread out. R204:116. Jorge Urias continued to flash his knife, and defendant yelled that 
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"he was going to f [Jorge Ramirez] up." R204:117. Defendant said to Jorge, "I'm 
going to kill you, dog." Id. 
After he had backed the family into the home, Ruben and the family members 
slammed the door closed. Id. Defendant and his friends were on the other side, "pushing 
hard . . . [and] kicking on the door." Id. Eventually, defendant and his friends stopped 
pushing the door. R204:118. 
Defendant left the hallway and went to the parking lot where he found Adrian 
hiding under the truck. R204:36. After defendant found Adrian, all of defendant's 
friends "arrived" and "grabbed [Adrian] and all of them started hitting [him]." R204:37. 
"[A] 11 five of them" joined in. R204:38. Defendant sat on Adrian's chest, holding him 
down. Id. La Borrega held Adrian's feet down. Id. Defendant said, "You're going to 
die, dog." R204:39. Defendant said, "Hand me the knife." Id. He continued, "Pass me 
the knife, mother f er." Id. Adrian could feel defendant sitting on his chest. R204:40. 
Just before passing out, Adrian felt his head being cut. Id. 
Back in the apartment, Jorge Ramirez realized that Adrian wasn't there. 
R204:118. Jorge, his sister Berenice, and Jose Luis went outside to look for Adrian. Id. 
Jorge's sister, Adalee, and his girlfriend, Rosa Solis, called the police. Id. Berenice and 
Jose Luis found Adrian lying in the snow, unconscious. R204:119. Adrian was bleeding 
heavily, he would not wake up, and his eyes had rolled back. Id. The family took Adrian 
to the hospital. R204:121. On their way to the hospital, they passed defendant and his 
friends driving in a small car, apparently slipping on the snow. Id. 
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Adrian awoke in the hospital. R204:51. Among his injuries were a large gash and 
some skin missing on the side of his head; bottle cuts on the neck, shoulder, chest; and a 
bruise where he had been kicked in the ribs. R204:52-58. The cut to the head required 
stitches and caused permanent scarring. R204:58. 
Asked whether he knew of any reason for defendant's anger, other than Jorge 
Ramirez's having returned the cocaine, Adrian testified, "I don't know. It might have 
been his." R204:60. 
Defendant's version 
Defendant claimed that that his friend Jorge Urias told him that his cousins were 
angry "because of [the] bad drugs that they said he sold them." R206:175. Defendant 
claimed that he went with his friends to the Ramirez apartment, "trying to be a mediator," 
because he "wanted to fix the problem between them." R206:175-76. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that the acquittal on the charge of simple assault against Rosa 
Solis is inconsistent with the guilty verdict for aggravated burglary. This claim is 
unpreserved. Defendant has not argued any exception to the preservation rules. This 
Court should decline to review this claim. In any case, the two verdicts were not 
inconsistent. Moreover, even if the two verdicts were inconsistent, the inconsistency 
would not require reversal of defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary. 
2. Defendant claims that the jury instructions did not adequately set forth the 
elements of aggravated robbery and argues, specifically, that they did not set forth the 
necessary intent. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. While he argues that this Court 
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should review his claim for manifest injustice, he affirmatively approved the jury 
instructions below, thereby inviting the alleged error and foreclosing review for manifest 
injustice. He also argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instructions. 
This claim fails, however, because the instructions accurately and adequately defined the 
elements of aggravated burglary, including the necessary intent, and accurately set forth 
the elements of the gang enhancement. 
3. Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not maintaining contact 
with him and not more fully consulting with him in preparation for trial. This claim fails 
because the trial court found, and defendant does not dispute, that defendant was 
responsible for the lack of contact. 
4. Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss 
the aggravated burglary count, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that he intended to enter the apartment. He also argues that the evidence does not 
support a finding that the aggravated burglary was committed in concert with two or 
more persons. Defendant preserved only the first claim. The second claim is 
unpreserved, and this court should decline review of that claim. Moreover, defendant has 
not marshaled the evidence with respect to either claim. This court should therefore 
assume the evidence supported the findings underlying the trial court's denial of his 
motion. In any event, during its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find that aggravated robbery and the gang enhancement had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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5. Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict 
on the aggravated burglary count and the finding that defendant committed the felony in 
concert with two or more others. Defendant has inadequately briefed this claim. He has 
not indicated whether it was preserved below. It apparently was not. He has not argued 
any exception to the preservation rule. He has not marshaled the evidence in support of 
the jury findings or adequately briefed his claim. This Court should deny review of the 
claim and/or assume that the evidence supported the jury's findings. In any case, the 
evidence sufficed. 
6. Defendant has not argued, much less demonstrated, that a biased juror sat. He 
therefore cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting or denying any 
challenge to a juror for cause. 
7. Defendant's claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is untimely and lacks record support. 
8. Defendant claims that the trial court should sua sponte have declared a mistrial 
when a witness volunteered that defendant had threatened his family. This claim is 
unpreserved. Defendant has not argued any exception to the preservation rule. He has 
inadequately briefed his claim. For these reasons, this Court should deny review of his 
claim. In any case, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte declare a mistrial. No 
manifest necessity existed for a mistrial, and an alternative to a mistrial existed. Rather 
than declare a mistrial, the trial court struck the volunteered testimony. In addition, the 
jury instructions admonished the jury not to consider any evidence that was stricken. 
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9. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred for not sua sponte including a lesser 
included instruction on criminal trespass is unpreserved. He has not argued any 
exception to the preservation rule. Moreover, because defendant affirmatively approved 
the instructions below, he invited any error, and review for plain error or manifest 
injustice is therefore unavailable. 
10. Defendant moved under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for 
remand to the district court for findings necessary to a determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. This Court denied that motion, and defendant now asks the 
Court to reconsider that denial. Because defendant has made no non-speculative 
allegation of facts and has provided no legal support for his request for reconsideration, 




THE GUILTY VERDICT FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY WAS 
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACQUITTAL FOR SIMPLE 
ASSAULT AGAINST ROSA SOLIS; BUT EVEN WHERE 
VERDICTS ARE INCONSISTENT, THE INCONSISTENCY DOES 
NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL 
Defendant first claims that "the verdict of not guilty as to count 7 is inconsistent 
with the aggravated burglary conviction and a new trial should be ordered." Appellant's 
Br. at 21 (capitalization and boldface omitted). 
A. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. Moreover, because defendant has not 
argued plain error or any other exception to the preservation rules, this 
Court should not review his claim. 
At the outset, defendant's claim fails because it is unpreserved and because he has 
argued no exception to the preservation rules. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, an appellant is required to include in his brief a "citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or "a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) 
& (B). "An issue is properly raised [and therefore preserved] in the trial court if: (1) the 
issue is raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue is specifically raised; and (3) the issue is 
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, f 
56, 102 P.3d 774 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional 
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error 
or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, *[} 13, 95 
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P.3d 276 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346). A party seeking 
review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the justification for review in the party's 
opening brief." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. 
Stevens, 2000 UT 98, *{ 9, 17 P.3d 1122). When a party fails to do so, an appellate court 
may refuse to consider the unpreserved issue. Id. at ^ 50, 58 (refusing to consider 
Pinder's unpreserved claims because he "failed to argue plain error or show exceptional 
circumstances on appeal"). 
Here, as his "Citation to the Record" in connection with this claim, defendant 
references the pages of the record that include the verdict forms. See Appellant's Br. at 2 
(citing R154-158). The verdict forms do not show that any issue was raised, much less 
that it was timely and specifically raised. Moreover, the verdict forms do not reference 
any evidence or relevant legal support for a claim. Defendant's cite thus does not show 
that any issue with respect to inconsistent verdicts was raised and preserved in the trial 
court.1 
Moreover, defendant has not argued any justification for review of his unpreserved 
claim. The "inconsistent verdicts" claim is briefed on pages 21-23 of Appellant's Brief. 
These pages do not mention "plain error" or any other exception to the preservation rule, 
nor do they set forth an argument explaining why any exception should apply to this 
1
 Neither has the State in its review found any location in the record where 
defendant preserved this claim. 
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claim. Because defendant has not articulated a justification for review of his unpreserved 
claim, this Court may decline to review it. 
B. The verdicts are not inconsistent. 
Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, the claim fails on the merits. 
First, the verdicts are not inconsistent. The jury found defendant not guilty on count 7, 
the charge of simple assault against Rosa Solis. R166. Defendant claims that the verdict 
on count 7 is inconsistent with the guilty verdict on count 1, aggravated burglary. 
Defendant claims that "the evidence as to entry into the premises was provided 
substantially by Rosa Solis." Appellant's Br. at 21. Defendant continues, arguing that 
the acquittal on the charge of simple assault against Rosa "is factually and legally 
inconsistent with the Aggravated Burglary count and creates a factual 
inconsistency. . . . if [Rosa] who testified that she was assaulted inside the residence 
specifically by [defendant] was found by the jury not to have been assaulted inside the 
residence, the jury should have also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find 
[defendant] guilty of Aggravated Burglary." Id. at 22. 
Defendant's claim is meritless. The jury instructions told the jury members that to 
find defendant guilty of simple assault against Rosa, they must find that he attempted to 
do bodily injury to Rosa, threatened to do bodily injury to Rosa, created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to Rosa, or caused bodily injury to Rosa. R148. The instructions told 
them that to find defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, they must find the defendant 
entered into a building with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault on any person, 
and that in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing, the defendant or another 
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participant in the crime caused bodily injury to any person, used or threatened the 
immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person, or possessed or attempted to 
use a dangerous weapon. R154. 
The jury's acquittal on count 7 meant only that the jury did not find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant attempted or threatened to do bodily injury to Rosa or 
that he caused a substantial risk of or did cause bodily injury to Rosa. It did not mean 
that he did not have the intent to do bodily injury to someone when he entered the 
apartment. Moreover, it did not mean that he did not attempt or threaten to do bodily 
injury to someone other than Rosa or that he did not cause a substantial risk of or did not 
cause bodily injury to someone other than Rosa. In fact, the State presented evidence to 
show that defendant and his friends injured Adrian, Jorge Ramirez, and Jose Luis during 
assaults at the apartment and when fleeing from the scene. The verdicts are not 
inconsistent. 
C. In any event, inconsistent verdicts do not require reversal. 
Furthermore, even assuming that the verdicts were inconsistent, that "alone is not 
sufficient to overturn [a] conviction." State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App. 
1994). Rather, the question on review of such a claim is simply whether the evidence 
suffices to support the jury verdict. State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986). 
Review for sufficiency of the evidence "should not be confused with the problems caused 
by inconsistent verdicts." Id. The State's burden is to "convince the jury with its proof 
and to "satisfy the courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 
16 
U.S. 57, 65 (1984)). "This review should be independent of the jury's determination that 
evidence on another count was insufficient." Id. (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 67). 
"Further safeguards against jury irrationality are [not] necessary." Id. (quoting Powell, 
469 U.S. at 67). 
In other words, while a conviction will be reversed where the evidence, viewed in 
a light favorable to the verdict, is insufficient to support the verdict, a conviction will not 
be reversed because the guilty verdict underlying the conviction may be inconsistent with 
an acquittal on another count. The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
"[inconsistent verdicts . . . present a situation where 'error,' in the sense that the jury has 
not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose 
ox has been gored." Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. The jury may have properly reached its 
guilty verdict "and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an 
inconsistent conclusion" on some other count. Id. The prosecution, however, "has no 
recourse if it wishes to correct" such error; it "is precluded from appealing or otherwise 
upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. 
Thus, "[t]he most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the 
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not 
show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt." Id. (quoting Dunn v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has "rejected], as imprudent and 
unworkable, a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge inconsistent 
verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of 
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some error that worked against them." Id. at 66. The Utah Supreme Court has also 
rejected such a rule. See Hancock, 874 P.2d at 134 ("In Utah, 'it is generally accepted 
that the inconsistency of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts 
aside.'") (quoting Stewart, 729 P.2d at 613-14). Rather, a defendant must show that 
"there was [not] sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt," 
that the defendant committed the crime for which he was convicted. See Stewart, 729 
P.2dat614. 
Thus, defendant's claim that the verdicts were inconsistent fails. The verdicts 
were not inconsistent. Even if they were, an inconsistency would not of itself require 
reversal of the conviction based on the guilty verdict. Rather, defendant would have to 
establish that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, was 
insufficient. 
Defendant claims insufficiency of the evidence in another point of his argument. 
The State addresses that claim below. 
II. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
WHERE HE AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: MOREOVER, COUNSEL WAS NOT 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS, 
WHICH PROPERLY SET FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND THE ENHANCEMENT 
Defendant next claims that his conviction for aggravated burglary "was based 
upon jury instructions that did not adequately define the first degree felony offense and 
failed to instruct of specific intent." Appellant's Br. at 23 (capitalization and boldface 
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omitted). Defendant objects specifically to jury instructions 26, 33, 34, and 35 (attached 
in Addendum B). See id. at 23-33. 
A. Defendant invited any error, thereby foreclosing review of his unpreserved 
claim for manifest injustice. 
Defendant acknowledges that his claim his unpreserved. See id. at 23. He claims, 
however, that this Court may review his claim under the doctrine of "manifest injustice." 
See id. Because defendant invited any error in the jury instructions, review for manifest 
injustice does not lie. 
"While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction 
assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim P. 19(e), a party 
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either 
by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection 
to the jury instruction.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
Utah courts "have recognized a number of ways in which a defendant has led a 
trial court into committing error." Id. at j^ 10. A defendant invites error "where his 
counsel confirm[s] on the record that the defense ha[s] no objection to the instructions 
given by the trial court." Id. He invites error "when he fail[s] to object to an instruction 
when specifically queried by the court." Id. He also invites error when "his proposed 
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jury instruction effectively le[ads] the trial court into adopting the erroneous jury 
instruction that he now challenges on appeal." Id. at \ 12. 
Here, the trial court and the parties conducted off-the-record discussions of the 
jury instructions. The court then asked the parties "to make a record as to the instructions 
that were or were not given." R206:265. The prosecutor stated that he "believe[d] the 
instructions given were appropriate." R206:265-66. The court observed that some 
changes had been made in the instructions pursuant to requests from defense counsel. 
R206:266. The court also observed that, in those instances where changes had been 
requested, but not made, the court had noted on the instructions why they had not been 
given. Id. Defense counsel then stated, "My only objection, your Honor, would be to 
instruction number 36. It's duplicative of instruction 40,1 believe." Id. Defense counsel 
thereby affirmatively represented to the court that he had no objection to any other 
instruction in its final form. By so doing, he invited any error as to the instructions he 
now claims were erroneous. For this reason, the jury instructions about which he now 
complains may not be assigned as error even if they constitute manifest injustice. 
B. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not "requesting] 
appropriate instructions." Appellant's Br. at 29. This claim also fails. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both prongs 
of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which 
holds that such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's 
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performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687-88; see also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 
810, 814 (Utah App.1994). To demonstrate prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
A defendant's burden is extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can 
"succeed[ ] only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from 
counsel's actions." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App.1995) (citation and 
quotations omitted). Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 
Tf 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted). 
1. The instructions accurately and adequately defined the elements of 
aggravated burglary, including the necessary intent. Counsel therefore had 
no reason to submit different instructions, and his performance did not fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudice defendant. 
As explained below, the instructions were not erroneous. Defendant therefore had 
no reason to request different instructions. His performance was neither deficient nor 
prejudicial. 
Defendant claims that the jury instructions did not adequately define aggravated 
burglary. Specifically, he claims that the instructions did not define the intent necessary 
to commit the crime and that they gave the jury "the option of convicting [him] as if he 
was present with other parties who may have intended to enter the residence to commit 
an assault or carry a knife, merely because of association.55 Appellant's Br. at 29-30. He 
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claims that he "never had any specific intent to fight when he went to the apartment and 
[therefore] never committed a First Degree Felony." Id. at 30. 
The jury instructions, however, were clear. Instruction 26 stated that to find 
defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, the jury had to find that he "entered or remained 
unlawfully . . . in a building or any portion of a building . . . with the intent to commit a 
felony, theft, or an assault on any person": 
To convict the defendant on count 1, AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY you must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about January 1, 2006, 
2. in the State of Utah, 
3. the defendant, as party to the offense, 
4. entered or remained unlawfully 
5. in a building or any portion of a building 
6. with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any 
person, 
7. and in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing, 
8. the defendant or another participant in the crime: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a 
participant in the crime, 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who was not a participant 
in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use a dangerous weapon. 
R154. 
As written, the instructions required the jury to find that "defendant, as party to the 
offense" had "the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person." R154. 
The instructions also defined "party to the offense" to mean "[e]very person, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
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person to engage in conduct which constitutes [the] offense." R144. Thus, the 
instructions did not permit a guilty verdict upon a finding that some other person had that 
intent where defendant did not. While defendant may have been found guilty based upon 
the acts of co-participants, he could not have been found guilty based upon their intent. 
Thus, he was not found guilty "merely because of association" or simply because his 
co-participants had the intent to enter the Ramirez apartment. 
2. Instructions 33-35 adequately set forth all elements necessary for finding that 
defendant acted "in concert" with two or more others. Counsel therefore had 
no reason to submit different instructions, and his performance did not fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudice defendant. 
Defendant also objects to instructions 33-35, which he apparently claims do not 
adequately set forth the mental intent required to support a finding that a defendant 
committed a crime in concert with two or more persons. See Appellant's Br. at 28-33. 
Relying on State v. Lopes, he argues that a jury must "fmd[], based upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, 'that all three actors . . . possessed a mental state sufficient to commit 
the same underlying offense and . . . directly committed the underlying offense or 
The instruction provided that defendant must have entered or remained "with the 
intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person." Defendant suggests that 
the trial court had a duty to sua sponte define what acts might have constituted a felony. 
In making the suggestion, defendant relies on a California case, People v. Failla, 414 
P.2d 39 (Cal. 1966). That case is inapposite. It treated factual circumstances under 
which the defendant may have been convicted of burglary on the basis of entering a 
building with the intent to commit an act that, while wrongful or even criminal, was not a 
felony or a theft or an assault. Thus, guidance from the court as to what may have 
constituted a felony was required. Here, however, the evidence did not suggest that the 
jury may have thought defendant committed some act that was a non-applicable 
misdemeanor or non-crime and, on the basis of defendant's intent to commit that act, 
found him guilty of burglary. 
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solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided on[e] of the other 
two actors to engage in conduct constituting] the underlying offense.5" Appellant's Br. 
at 28-29 (quoting Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ 8, 980 P.2d 191). 
Defendant's claim, however, rests on the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of a 
former version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. When Lopes committed a murder in 
February 1996, the 1995 version of that statute was in effect. The 1995 version did, in 
fact, require "that all three actors . . . possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the 
same underlying offense." Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 8. The 1995 version read in part: 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in 
concert with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the 
offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant and two or more of the other persons would be criminally liable 
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(l)(a) & (b) (1995) (emphasis added). Section 76-2-202 
stated at the time, as it does now, that a person who acts "with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense" and "directly commits the offense, [or] solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). 
In an amendment to section 76-3-203.1, effective March 14, 2000, the legislature 
redefined "in concert." See 2000 Utah Laws 717. That amendment established the 
current definition of "in concert," the definition applicable in January 2006 when 
defendant committed the offenses for which he was convicted. The current version of the 
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statute does not require that all three actors possess a mental state sufficient to commit 
the same underlying offense. Rather, it provides in relevant part: 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is 
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) 
if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in 
concert with two or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in 
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, 
and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to 
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; 
and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a 
party if he were an adult. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2006). 
Thus, under the version of the statute in effect at the time of defendant's 
offenses, a jury could find that a defendant acted "in concert" with other persons if 
those persons aided or encouraged defendant and were physically present. See id. 
Alternatively, a jury could find that a defendant acted "in concert" with other 
persons if those persons "aided or encouraged" defendant and, while not 
physically present, "participated as parties to any of various enumerated offenses." 
See id. Even under the latter circumstances, those persons "need not have had the 
intent to engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant." See 
id. 
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The jury instructions accurately set forth the elements. Instruction 26, 
reproduced in its entirety in Addendum B, told the jury members that if they 
found defendant guilty on any count, they should then determine whether 
defendant acted "in concert with two or more persons." R147. Instruction 34, 
also reproduced in its entirety in Addendum B, defined "in concert with two or 
more persons" tracking the language of the statute relevant at the time of the 
offense. See R145. It also defined "party to the offense" in the language of the 
section 76-2-202. See R144. 
The instructions were accurate. Because the instructions were accurate, 
defense counsel was not deficient for not objecting to them, and defendant 
suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's not objecting. 
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for "allowing] the issue 
of gang enhancement to be submitted at the same time as the issue of accomplice liability 
to the underlying charges." Appellant's Br. at 33. He asserts that "this procedure . . . 
caused an improper verdict." Id. This claim contains no legal support and no analysis. It 
is inadequately briefed, and this Court should therefore decline to review it. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant's brief to set forth an argument that "contain[s] 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also State v. 
Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 15, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998)) ("'It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed.'"). In any case, the verdict forms told the jury members to first 
consider whether defendant was guilty on each count and to make a special finding about 
whether defendant did or did not act "in concert" with others "only if [they] ha[d] found 
the Defendant guilty" on the count. See Rl 66-69. Thus, the jury deliberated twice on 
each count of conviction. Defendant does not explain how or why this procedure would 
have caused an improper verdict. 
26 
III. 
DEFENDANT WHO, WITHOUT REASON, FAILED TO MAINTAIN 
CONTACT WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL, HAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MORE FULLY 
CONSULTING WITH HIM DURING PREPARATION FOR TRIAL 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not preparing more fully for 
trial. Specifically, he claims that counsel's "acknowledgement. . . that he needed 
additional time to prepare and had not been sufficiently in contact with [defendant]" 
evidenced ineffective assistance. Appellant's Br. at 34. 
Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue. While his brief sets forth the 
Strickland standard for making out an ineffective assistance claim, he cites no authority 
for his claim that counsel was deficient for not finding and contacting defendant when 
defendant failed to keep in contact. Thus, his claim is inadequately briefed, and this 
Court should decline to review it. In any case, defendant has not met the Strickland 
standard. He has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 
Proceedings below. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to continue trial 
because he "had not had an opportunity to adequately discuss and prepare for the case" 
and "hadn't been in contact with [his] client." R205:7. The trial court denied the motion, 
finding that defendant was responsible for the lack of contact. The court found, "It is 
clear that the Defendant had for a period of time not kept in contact with his counsel." 
R205:8. The court further found that there had "been no evidence presented . . . that the 
Defendant was in any way unable to make contact with his counsel." R205:8. The court 
found that defendant had "retained counsel from the very beginning of this case," but that 
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defendant "had for a period of time not kept in contact with his counsel." R205:8. The 
court ruled that defendant had a duty to maintain contact with his counsel and found that 
he had no legitimate reason for not doing so. R205:9. Nothing in the court's findings or 
in the record suggests that counsel was responsible for the lack of contact. 
Analysis. Defendant claims that counsel was deficient for not contacting him and 
suggests that he was prejudiced. See Appellant's Br. at 33-34. He does not, however, 
dispute the trial court's findings that he, not counsel, was responsible for the lack of 
contact. See id. Defendant's claim is therefore defeated by the facts as found by the trial 
court. 
Further, the claim is without record support. Nothing in the record suggests that 
counsel did not attempt to contact defendant. Nothing in the record suggests what 
information counsel might have obtained from defendant that would have changed his 
defense or made a difference in the result. Thus, the record supports neither a 
determination that counsel was deficient nor a determination that defendant was 
prejudiced. Because defendant has not provided a record adequate to support his claim, 
this court must presume that counsel performed effectively. See State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, Tf 17, 12 P.3d 92 (stating that a defendant bears the burden of proof on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that when the record is "inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor 
of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). 
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IV. 
BECAUSE THE STATE PRODUCED EVIDENCE CAPABLE OF 
SUPPORTING A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH THE 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY COUNT AND THE GANG 
ENHANCEMENT, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the 
aggravated burglary count, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that defendant intended to enter the apartment. Appellant's Br. at 36. He also argues 
that the evidence did not support a finding that the aggravated burglary was committed in 
concert with two or more persons. Id. 
Proceedings below. After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict 
on count 1 (aggravated burglary), count 3 (assault on Ruben Ramirez), and count 4 
(assault on Fiorina Chavez). R206:64. Defense counsel argued that the State had not 
"presented evidence that the defendant had intent to commit a felony, a theft or an 
assault, as required by Count 1." R206:95. Counsel also argued that the State had not 
"show[n] that [defendant] possessed a dangerous weapon, used it, or threatened with a 
dangerous weapon." Id. Counsel made no argument concerning the "in concert" 
enhancement. See id. 
Applicable law. "When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 
believable evidence to withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief, [the 
reviewing court] appl[ies] the same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict. Hence, 
believable evidence in this context means the evidence must be capable of supporting a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 41 (internal 
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quotation marks and citation omitted). "[I]f upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence 
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, [the court] will uphold the denial of a motion to 
dismiss." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Analysis. At the outset, defendant's claim fails because he preserved only a 
portion of his claim and did not argue any exception to the preservation rules to justify 
review of the unpreserved portion. It fails also because defendant did not marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings he now challenges on appeal. 
Defendant preserved this claim only with respect to the issue of whether defendant 
entered the apartment with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. He did not 
claim below that the evidence was insufficient to support the "in concert" enhancement 
and makes no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument to justify review on 
appeal. This Court may therefore decline review of defendant's claim regarding the 
enhancement. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45 (stating that court may refuse to consider 
unpreserved issue where defendant does not articulate exception to preservation rules). 
Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 
aggravated burglary charge is a challenge to a trial court's finding. If a challenge is made 
to a finding, an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the 
trial court and then demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of fact. See State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108 (stating that an appellant wishing to 
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challenge a trial court's findings of fact must not only marshal the evidence in support of 
the findings, but also "show that the trial court's findings so lack support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous") (quotations and 
citations omitted). "If an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, any 
attempt by defendant to "marshal" his evidence by listing it in an addendum does not 
comply with the marshaling requirement. SeeA.K. &R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating 
v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518, 525 (Utah App. 1999). An "addendum does not include a 
properly focused marshaling of the evidence supporting particular findings under attack, 
but rather is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the record." Id. Thus, listing 
evidence in the addendum does not meet the marshaling requirement. 
Defendant did not marshal the evidence. See Appellant's Br. at 35-36. While he 
refers to evidence set forth in his addendum, the addendum simply contains a summary of 
the testimony given at trial. See id. (Addendum at 37-60). It does not include a properly 
focused marshaling of the evidence supporting the finding under attack, and it does not 
meet the marshaling requirement. This Court should therefore assume the evidence 
supported the findings underlying the trial court's determination. See Larsen, 828 P.2d at 
490. 
31 
In any case, the evidence presented at trial was capable of supporting a verdict that 
defendant committed aggravated robbery. Specifically, the evidence sufficed to show 
that defendant entered the Ramirez apartment with the intent to commit an assault. 
Adrian testified that defendant had telephoned to express his anger, had stated that "[h]e 
was going to f us all," had thereafter appeared at the threshold of the Ramirez 
apartment, and, immediately after the door was opened, thrust his fist into the apartment 
and hit Adrian. R204:20-25. This evidence, while circumstantial as to defendant's 
intent, sufficed to support a finding that he entered with the intent to commit an assault. 
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,126, 10 P.3d 346 (noting that "intent is rarely 
established by direct evidence," stating that it "may be proven by circumstantial 
evidence," and holding that a reviewing court "must look to the circumstantial evidence 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to determine whether the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make 
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust") (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, the evidence sufficed to show that in the course of committing or 
fleeing the burglary, defendant personally caused bodily injury to Adrian. See 
R204:38-40 (State's evidence that defendant used a knife to cut Adrian while leaving the 
burglary site). That sufficed to establish aggravated robbery. 
Further, defendant, as a party to the crime, was also liable for Jorge Urias's use or 
threatened use of the knife and his other friends' use or threatened use of broken bottles 
in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing from the burglary. See RR204:109, 
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111, 115, 117 (State's evidence that Jorge waved his switchblade at the Ramirez family 
members, that Jorge Urias, Angel, and La Diabla all carried broken bottles at the time 
they entered the Ramirez apartment, and that Angel used a bottle to cut Jorge Ramirez 
three times). That alternatively sufficed to establish aggravated robbery. 
The evidence was also sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted in 
concert with two or more other persons. Adrian testified that defendant was accompanied 
by at least four friends. R204:29; State's Exhibit 2. After defendant had thrust his fist 
into the apartment and punched Adrian, one of defendant's friends stepped inside the 
apartment and pulled Adrian out into the hallway where defendant continued beating 
him. R204:26-28. The other three friends entered the apartment carrying broken bottles 
and began fighting with Adrian's brother and cousin. R204:109. After Adrian ran away 
and hid under the truck, defendant and his friends found him and all of them hit him. 
R204:37. 
This testimony sufficed to support an inference that defendant "was aided or 
encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the [aggravated burglary] offense 
and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(l)(b). In addition, it sufficed to show that each of the other persons "was 
physically present," thus fulfilling one of the two alternative additional statutory 
requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(l)(b)(i). 
Thus, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss at the end of the State's 
case. The State had presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
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elements of the crime and the enhancing circumstances had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
V. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND THE 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN 
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PEOPLE 
Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict on 
the aggravated burglary count and the finding that defendant committed the felony in 
concert with two or more others. Appellant's Br. at 36. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this claim also. He has not indicated whether 
it was preserved below.4 See Appellant's Br. at 36-37. He has not argued any exception 
to the preservation rule to justify review of his claim on appeal. See id. For these 
reasons, this Court should not review this claim. 
Moreover, while defendant has again referenced the summary of testimony set 
forth in his addendum, he has failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
jury verdict. See id. For this reason, even if this Court should grant review, it should 
assume the record supports the jury verdict. 
In any case, the evidence again sufficed. When reviewing a jury verdict, an 
appellate court "reviewfs] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 
Nor has the State in its review of the record been able to locate any place where 
defendant preserved this claim. 
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2002 UT 124, Tf 15, 63 P.3d 94. The court "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id. (citation omitted). 
In this case, as explained under Point IV, above, the State presented sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant had the requisite intent to commit 
aggravated burglary and its finding that defendant acted with two or more persons. 
Defendant's only remaining claim appears to be that the evidence did not support a 
finding that he "entered" the apartment. The evidence showed, however, that both 
defendant and his friends physically entered the Ramirez apartment. When Adrian 
opened the apartment door, defendant thrust his arm into the apartment to hit Adrian. See 
R204:24-25. This sufficed to support a finding that defendant himself entered the 
apartment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(4) (West 2004) ("Enter" means . . . 
"[ijntrusion of any part of the body" or "[i]ntrusion of any physical object under control 
of the actor."); State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah 1985) (holding that intrusion 
of defendant's head, hands, and arms through a window constituted an entry). In 
addition, the evidence showed that after defendant thrust his hand into the apartment, his 
friends entered the apartment, pulled Adrian into the hallway, and began fighting other 
family members inside the apartment. See R204:26-27, 105. The finding that defendant, 
as a party to the crime, entered the apartment is supportable on the basis of the entry by 
other parties to the crime. See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1994) 
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(affirming aggravated burglary conviction of defendant where co-participants entered 
home while defendant waited at another location). 
VI. 
BECAUSE HE CANNOT SHOW THAT A BIASED JUROR SAT, 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN GRANTING OR DENYING A 
MOTION TO STRIKE A JUROR FOR CAUSE 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred when it granted the State's 
motion to strike Juror No. 3 for cause "based upon the fact that she had young children 
and the fact that she had an uncle and a friend who she believed were wrongfully 
convicted." Appellant's Br. at 37. He further claims that the trial court "committed plain 
error by denying [his] equivocal challenge of Juror 10 for cause, and by failing to sua 
sponte remove Juror 10 for cause." Id. at 38. He cannot prevail on these claims because 
he has not demonstrated that a biased juror sat. 
Proceedings below. After voir dire, the State moved to strike Juror No. 3 for 
cause. R205:130. Defense counsel objected. Id. The trial court granted the motion, 
finding that the juror was "internally conflicted in light of her experience and has ongoing 
doubts about the ability of the justice system to bring forward facts that are and should be 
considered relevant to her determination." R205:131-132.5 
5
 The trial court also removed on its own motion Juror No. 28, who had a nephew 
in prison and was "clearly conflicted," believed that her nephew had been convicted and 
imprisoned by a jury that did not know all the facts, and would "continue to think about 
[her nephew's] situation in this trial." R205:137. Defense counsel "objected] for the 
sake of objecting because [he] th[ought] she would be a good juror." Id. Defendant 
mentions the removal of Juror 28 in his brief, but does not claim that the trial court erred 
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Applicable law. "Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing such a ruling, [the appellate court] 
reverse[s] only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 
283, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah App. 
1994)) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted). "If a defendant 
believes the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause, in order to preserve the 
error on appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is 
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause." Id. (quoting State v. 
Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997)). Moreover, "[e]ven if the trial court has 
erroneously granted or denied a challenge for cause,. . . to prevail on a claim of error . . . 
a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial 
or incompetent." Id. (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 400 (Utah 1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Analysis. Defendant has inadequately briefed his claim. While arguing that the 
trial court denied his "equivocal challenge to Juror No. 10 for cause," defendant has not 
cited to any place in the record where he made such a challenge.6 See Appellant's Br. at 
38. Neither has set forth any reason why he might have challenged Juror No. 10 or any 
reason for his claim that the trial court should sua sponte have removed that juror. See id. 
in removing her. If defendant intended to make some claim of error with respect to this 
juror, he has not articulated the nature of his claim, and it is therefore inadequately 
briefed. 
6
 Nor has the State in its review of the record been able to locate any place where 
defendant made such a challenge. 
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Thus, his claim of error as to Juror 10 is indiscernible. It is inadequately briefed, and this 
Court need not review it. 
Moreover, as to Juror No. 3, defendant has not explained the rationale for the 
court's granting the State's challenge of Juror No. 3 for cause nor has he explained why 
the rationale was faulty. See id. at 37-38. He has not set forth the law applicable to 
review of a trial court's decisions regarding challenges for cause. See id. at 37-39. For 
these reasons, this claim, like the claim regarding Juror No. 10, is inadequately briefed, 
and this Court need not review it. 
In any case, the claims fail on the merits. A defendant who claims that a trial 
court plainly erred in granting or denying a motion to strike a juror for cause must show 
that a biased juror sat. Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 283 (citing Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398, 400). 
Defendant has not alleged, much less demonstrated, that any member of the selected 
panel was biased. Thus, he cannot prevail on his claim of error based on the trial court's 
granting of or denying of challenges for cause. 
VII. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY DRAWN FROM A FAIR 
CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IS UNTIMELY 
Defendant claims that he "was denied a fair jury panel containing Hispanic 
persons." Appellant's Br. at 39 (capitalization and boldface omitted). Defendant cannot 
succeed on this claim, which is untimely and lacks record support. 
Applicable law, A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right "to an impartial jury 
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 338 
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(Utah 1993) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1975); Hoytv. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961)). "[J]ury wheels, 
pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically 
exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably 
representative thereof." Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement," 
a defendant must show first "that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive9 group 
in the community"; second, "that the representation of this group in venires from which 
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in 
the community"; and third, "that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion 
of the group in the jury-selection process." Id. at 364. 
To establish the existence of a distinctive group, the first prong, a defendant must 
show "that a particular group [is] of sufficient numerosity and distinctiveness to be 
cognizable for fair cross-section purposes." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575-76 (Utah 
1987). To establish the second prong, the defendant must "demonstrate the percentage of 
the community made up of the group alleged to be underrepresented" and show that that 
percentage of the venires made up by the group is "not fair and reasonable." Duren, 439 
U.S. at 364. Finally, to demonstrate the third prong, systematic exclusion, the defendant 
must show that the "discrepancy occurred not just occasionally," but that it was "inherent 
in the particular jury-selection process utilized." Id. at 366. 
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Once a defendant has made a prima facie case showing an infringement of his 
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section, the State "bears the burden of justifying 
this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a 
significant state interest." Id. at 368. If the State demonstrates a significant state interest, 
the State must also demonstrate that exemptions furthering that interest caused the 
challenged underrepresentation. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that issues of jury 
composition must be raised before a jury is sworn. "In all of this court's decisions since 
[State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991)], we have never deviated from the rule that a 
challenge to the composition of the jury must be raised before the jury is sworn in. .. . It 
has therefore long been the law in Utah that constitutional challenges to the composition 
of the jury—both [to] the venire and to the selected jury—must be raised before the jury 
is sworn." State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, \ 35, 140 P.3d 1219 (citations omitted). 
Analysis. At the outset, defendant cannot prevail on this claim because it is 
untimely. "[A] constitutional challenge to the jury selection process—whether it be to 
the entire venire or to the jury selected to try the case—must be brought before the jury is 
sworn." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, J^ 37. Because defendant raises his claim for the first time 
on appeal, his claim is untimely. 
Moreover, the claim is without record support. Defendant has presented no 
evidence of the numerosity of Hispanics in the community from which the venire was 
drawn, the percentage of Hispanics in the population, the percentage of Hispanics injury 
pools, or the systematic exclusion of Hispanics from the venires from which jury panels 
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are selected. See Appellant's Br. at 39-41. Thus, defendant has not demonstrated a 
prima facie violation of his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the 
community.7 
VIII. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS UNPRESERVED 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD SUA SPONTE HAVE 
DECLARED A MISTRIAL 
During cross-examination by defense counsel, Jorge Ramirez volunteered the 
following statement: "I am afraid . . . [b]ecause [defendant] has threatened my wife and 
we have a little girl and [defendant] has threatened her with her life." R204:127. 
Defendant moved to strike the statement, and the trial court struck it as "not responsive to 
the question that was posed." R204:127-28. Defendant made no further objections or 
requests. He did not request a mistrial, and he did not ask for a cautionary instruction. 
On appeal, defendant now claims that the trial court should not only have stricken 
the statement from the record, but should sua sponte have declared a mistrial because 
"the inherent prejudice was unfair and created a presumption that the Appellant was a 
person of bad character." Appellant's Br. at 42. 
7
 Defendant suggests in passing that defense counsel was ineffective for not 
raising a fair-cross-section challenge. See Appellant's Br. at 40. This claim is 
inadequately briefed. In any case, the record is inadequate to show that defendant could 
have established a fair-cross-section violation, had he challenged the jury selection 
process below. A defendant bears the burden of proof on an ineffective assistance claim 
and when the record is "inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. 
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Defendant's claim was not preserved below. The preservation rule "applies to 
every claim, including constitutional questions," unless an appellant alleges and 
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, j^ 11, 10 P.3d 346. Defendant has neither alleged nor demonstrated exceptional 
circumstances or plain error. This Court should therefore decline to review his claim. 
Moreover, defendant has inadequately briefed his claim. He has cited no support 
for his claim that a trial court has the duty to sua sponte declare a mistrial under any 
circumstances, let alone under the circumstances of this case. See Appellant's Br. at 
41-42. Thus, his claim is inadequately briefed. As explained above, this Court will not 
address arguments that are inadequately briefed. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, [^ 15, 
99P.3d820. 
In any case, defendant could not prevail on this claim even had he argued plain 
error and adequately briefed his claim. A trial court seldom has a duty to sua sponte 
declare a mistrial. Some jurisdictions have simply held that in general trial courts have 
no duty to sua sponte declare mistrials. See, e.g., Zachary v. State, 188 S.W.3d 917, 920 
(Ark. 2004); State v. Young, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Other 
jurisdictions have clarified that although courts may have the authority to sua sponte 
declare mistrials, that authority is "subject to the constraints of the defendant's right to 
have his trial completed by a particular jury." March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 717 (Alaska 
1993). 
This Court has stated that "declaring mistrials sua spont[e] . . . must be indulged 
with a high degree of caution and circumspection on the part of a trial judge." State v. 
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Dennis, 385 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1963) (addressing claim that trial court should sua 
sponte have declared a mistrial after defense counsel stated to jury that defendant had 
confessed and would repeat confession on the stand). This Court suggested that any duty 
to sua sponte declare a mistrial would arise only if the underlying error had "render[ed] 
the trial a 'farce and a mockery."' Id. at 154 n.2 (citing People v. Dupree, 319 P.2d 39 
(1957)). 
To impose a duty upon trial courts to sua sponte declare mistrials in criminal cases 
may put them in a position where they are "damned if they do" and "damned if they 
don't." On the one hand, failure to declare a mistrial may constitute reversible error. On 
the other hand, declaring a mistrial may result in a double jeopardy violation. One court 
explained the dilemma in this way: 
Appellate courts are wary of claims that a trial court erred in failing to 
declare a mistrial sua sponte in a criminal case. That is because generally, 
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States bars retrial if a judge grants a mistrial in a criminal case 
without the defendant's request or consent. Consequently, a judge who 
declares a mistrial in a criminal case sua sponte may thereafter be 
confronted by the defendant's contention that he cannot be retried. 
Reversing convictions because trial courts fail to declare mistrials sua 
sponte allows defendants to remain mute when incidents unfavorable to 
them occur during trial, gamble on the verdict, then obtain a new trial if the 
verdict is adverse. This puts trial courts in an untenable position and is 
contrary to the principle that an appellate court will not, on review, convict 
a trial court of error on an issue which was not put before it to decide. 
State v. Derrick, 965 S.W.2d 418, 420 n.l (Mo. App. 1998). 
Utah cases illustrate circumstances where a trial judge, intending to ensure that a 
trial was fair, has sua sponte declared a mistrial, only to have a subsequent prosecution 
dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. See State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979), 
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overruled on other grounds by State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, 104 P.3d 1250; West Valley 
City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, 981 P.2d 420. 
Furthermore, even if in some circumstances a trial court has a duty to sua sponte 
declare a mistrial, such circumstances did not exist in this case. Before sua sponte 
declaring a mistrial, a trial court must determine that a "manifest necessity for declaring a 
mistrial exists." Patten, 1999 UT App 149, fflf 12-13. The court must also determine that 
"there are no alternatives to a mistrial." Id. at [^ 13. 
Here, there was an alternative. The trial court could have stricken, and in fact did 
strike, the witness's volunteered statement. The jury was instructed that where "an 
objection is sustained the evidence is not admitted and you should not consider it." R46 
(uppercase omitted). 
Jurors are presumed to obey instructions. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 
(Utah 1998) (adopting the standard set forth in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 
(1987): "[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 'overwhelming 
probability5 that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong 
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 
1994) ("We generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given it."); State v. 
Devey, 2006 UT App 219, ^ 16, 138 P.3d 90 (denying defendant's motion for new trial 
based on presumption that jurors would follow instruction). 
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Nothing in this case suggests an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was 
unable to follow the court's instruction or that mention of the stricken testimony was 
"devastating" to the defendant. Thus, this Court may presume that the jury followed the 
trial court's instruction to disregard the stricken testimony volunteered by the witness. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial not only had no duty to sua sponte 
declare a mistrial, but, even had defendant moved for a mistrial, could properly have 
exercised its discretion to deny the motion. Thus, defendant has demonstrated no 
"manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial." 
IX. 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, HE CANNOT ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT PLAINLY ERRED FOR NOT SUA SPONTE GIVING A 
LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
Defendant claims that the trial "court erred in failing to instruct as to the lesser 
included offense of trespassing." Appellant's Br. at 42. Defendant did not request a 
lesser included instruction below, and his claim is therefore unpreserved. He has neither 
alleged nor demonstrated exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal. This Court 
should therefore decline to review his claim. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^} 50, 58. 
In any case, plain error does not lie because defendant invited any error. As 
explained above, defendant affirmatively approved the jury instructions as given with the 
exception of Jury Instruction 36, which he asserted was duplicative. Thus, he invited any 
error in the remaining instructions, and review for plain error does not lie. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 164 9 (siting Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54). 
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X. 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT MAKES NO NON-SPECULATIVE 
ALLEGATION OF FACTS AND PROVIDES NO LEGAL SUPPORT 
FOR HIS REQUEST THAT THIS COURT RECONSIDER ITS 
EARLIER DENIAL OF HIS RULE 23B MOTION FOR REMAND, 
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY IT 
Defendant asserts "the necessity of additional testimony concerning the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel" and "submits that [this Court] should reconsider the 
denial of the Motion to Remand the case for hearing." Appellant's Br. at 44. 
After the record was filed in this case, defendant moved for a remand under rule 
23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record with findings 
necessary to a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This Court 
denied the motion, holding that defendant's "motion [wa]s simply too speculative to 
require a remand" and that it would be "improper to remand a claim under rule 23B for a 
fishing expedition." Order, dated May 31, 2007 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
A remand is available only upon a "nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that 
counsel was ineffective," that is, that defense counsel's performance was deficient and 
the defendant was prejudiced. Utah R. App P. 23B. 
While defendant now asks this Court to reconsider its denial of the motion, he 
does not provide any nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record, 
to support the motion. He does not explain why this Court erred when it denied his 
original motion. He does nothing more than assert that his appellate brief shows "the 
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entire context of the matter and the necessity of additional testimony concerning the issue 
of ineffective assistance." Appellant's Br. at 44. 
o 
Defendant has not supported his motion for reconsideration. This Court should 
therefore deny it. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this i day of _ O r l o W , 2007. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
NNEB.INOUYE ' ( f 
^tant Attorney General 
eys for Appellee 
Moreover, defendant has cited no provision of the appellate rules that permits 
reconsideration of the denial of a Rule 23B motion for remand. 
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488 U.S. 563, 102 L.Ed.2d 927. 
Variance between indictment and trial 
proof, right to be tried only on charges 
in grand jury indictment, see U.S. v. 
Miller, U.S.Cal.1985, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 
471 U.S. 130, 85 L.Ed.2d 99, on re-




was obvious from the record that defendant had 
pleaded guilty to the offense of attempted theft 
of property from the person of the complaining 
witness and not to offense of attempted theft, it 
was not necessary that evidence be presented as 
to value of property which defendant attempted 
to steal, and defendant was properly sentenced 
to an indeterminate term, despite defendant's 
contention that he had been sentenced for at-
tempted theft and, therefore, maximum sen-
tence could not be in excess of six months 
because property involved was worth less that 
$100. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-103(2), 76-3-203(2), 
76-6-412, 76-6-412(a)(iv). Henline v. Smith, 
1976, 548 P.2d 1271. Larceny <S=> 88 
4. Sex offenses 
One to fifteen-year sentence imposed on de-
fendant convicted of rape was proper statutory 
penalty for offense and sentence would not be 
reversed and modified since it was not clearly 
excessive or abuse of trial court's discretion, 
notwithstanding that, prior to defendant's at-
tempted escape from courtroom, trial judge had 
stated his intention to defer sentencing until 
after evaluation period, but rescinded recom-
mendation for evaluation after the escape at-
tempt. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203, 76-3-404, 
76-5-402. State v. Gerrard, 1978, 584 P.2d 
885. Rape<®=>64 
Where, in prosecution for aggravated sexual 
assault, only matter relied upon by State as an 
aggravating circumstance was fact that victim 
was under 14 years of age, and, at time of 
offense, rape statute provided that male com-
mits rape when he has sexual intercourse with 
female, not his wife, without her consent and 
that rape is a felony of second degree and 
another statute provided that an act of sexual 
intercourse is without consent when victim is 
under 14 years of age, defendant should have 
been sentenced pursuant to statute relating to 
second-degree felony, one to 15 years, rather 
than pursuant to statute relating to first-degree 
felony, five years to life, since there were two 
statutes which prohibited same conduct but im-
posed different penalties. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-203(1, 2), 76-5-402, 76-5-405, 76-5-406; 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-405(l)(b), Laws 1973, c. 196. 
State v. Loveless, 1978, 581 P.2d 575. Rape C» 
64 
Where new penal code was enacted after de-
fendant perpetrated sodomy but before he was 
sentenced, defendant could not complain be-
cause he was sentenced under new code where 
sentence received was lesser than that which 
would have been warranted under old law. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-1-103, 76-3-203(2), 
76-3-204(2), 76-5-403(1-3), 76-53-22. State 
v. Atkinson, 1975, 532 P.2d 215. Criminal Law 
®» 1165(3) 
5. Review 
State was not precluded from raising for first 
time on appeal issue whether trial court im-
posed illegal sentence upon revocation of proba-
tion; under Rules of Criminal Procedure court 
may correct illegal sentence at any time. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203(2); Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 22(e). State v. Peterson, 1994, 869 P.2d 
989. Criminal Law <3=> 1042 
Defendant who was charged and convicted of 
aggravated burglary but whose motion to enter 
judgment of conviction for next lower category 
of offense was granted by court resulting in him 
being convicted of attempted aggravated battery 
and sentenced to statutory penalty for attempted 
aggravated burglary was not entitled on appeal 
to attack constitutionality of punishment for ag-
gravated burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203(1, 2), 
76-3-402(1), 76-4-102(2), 76-6-203(1 )(c). 
State v. Harding, 1978, 576 P.2d 1284. Crimi-
nal Law <&=> 1136 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 . 1 . Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons— 
Notice—Enhanced penalties 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to 
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of 
fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two 
or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in 
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, 
and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
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(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to 
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a 
party if he were an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall 
cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the 
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine 
years and which may be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chap-
ter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, 
and 76-6-520; 
(/) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chap-
ter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
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(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and 
Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that 
the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are 
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
Laws 1990, c 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3, 
1999; Laws 2000, c 214, § 2, eff March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c 209, § 2, eff April 30, 
2001. 
Cross References 
Juveniles, considerations in certification hearings, see § 78-3a-603 
Law Rev iew and Journal Commentar ies 
Cheney, Case Law Developments The Burden Smith, Utah's Gang Enhancement Statute 
of Proof for Imposing Utah's Group Crime Sen- Did the Legislature Create a Sentencing Factor 
tence Enhancement, 1998 Utah L Rev 611 As It Intended or Did It Unwittingly Create an 
( 1 9 9 8 ) , Element of the Offense?, 2000 Utah L Rev 671 
Dymek, Case Law Developments Utah's (2000) 
Gang Enhancement Statute Found Unconstitu-
tional in Part, 1999 Utah L Rev 1027 (1999) 
Library References 
Sentencing and Punishment C=>89 C J S Criminal Law §§ 14o0, 1465, 1472, 
Westlaw Key Number Search 350Hk89 1479, 1492, 1526, 1530 
N o t e s of Dec i s ions 
In general 1 Utah Adv Rep 27, 2000 UT 70 Sentencing 
Construction and application 2 And Punishment O 1050 
Due process 3 Under "gang enhancement" statute, state is 
Guilty pleas 5 required to prove that all three actors (1) pos-
Homicide 7 sessed a mental state sufficient to commit the 
Notice 4 same underlying offense, and (2) directly corn-
Presumptions and burden of proof 9 mitted the underlying offense or solicited, re-
Review 11 quested, commanded, encouraged, or intention-
Right to jury trial 6 ^ ty ai(^e<i o n e °f t n e other two actors to engage 
Severance of unconstitutional provision 8 m conduct constituting the underlying offense 
Sufficiency of evidence 10 J> C A ^ ^™iV& ^
 u ?*% v 
J
 Lopes, 1999, 980 P 2d 191 365 Utah Adv Rep 
17, 1999 UT 24 rehearing denied Sentencing 
1. In general ^ ^ Punishment C=> 94 
Trial court acted in accordance with require- 2. Construction and application 
ments of sentencmg statutes in sentencing de- p o r purposes of gang crime enhancement 
fendant to single, enhanced minimum sentences statute, "in concert" means that the other mdi-
for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery viduals who participated with defendant would 
once gang enhancement was found appropriate, be criminally liable for the offense as accom-
court was not required to impose sentence first phces under accomplice liability statute U C A 
on underlying charge and then on gang en- 1953, 76-2-202, 76-3-203 l(l)(b) State ex rei 
hancement U C A 1953, 76-3-203 l(3)(e) V T , 2000, 5 P 3d 1234, 398 Utah Adv Rep 10, 
(1999) State v Helrmck, 2000, 9 P 3d 164, 402 2000 UT App 189 Criminal Law O 89 
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moreover, its decision is informed by the under-
standing that the exercise of discretion in sentenc-
ing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of 
the trial court and appellate court can properly 
find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
person would take the view adopted by the trial 
court. State v. Moreno, 2005, 113 P.3d 992, 525 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 200. Criminal 
Law <s= 1147 
concert with two or more persons— 
Notice—Enhanced penalties 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant 
was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was 
aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the 
same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he were 
an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine years and 
which may be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related 
offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 
76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(Z) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
15 
992, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 200. 
Sentencing And Punishment <$=> 114 
Appellate court will reverse a sentence only if it 
determines that a sentencing court has exceeded 
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differ-
ently, if it determines that the trial court failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a 
sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits; 
§ 76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in 
§ 76-3-203.1 CRIMINAL COD] 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 7( 
Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
Laws 1990, c. 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 
214, § 2, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 93, § 9, eff. May 2, 
2005. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2005, c. 93 deleted "76-6-503" preceding 
"76-6-504" in subsec. (4)(k). 
United States Supreme Court 
Multiple offenses, cution where an act took place, see Whit-
In general, field v. U.S., 2005, 125 S.Ct. 687. 
Conspiracy, money laundering, proof of 
overt act, venue provision allowing prose-
Notes of Decisions 
5. Guilty pleas 
Defendant could be sentenced under gang en-
hancement statute, pursuant to his negotiated 
guilty plea to the felony offense of committing 
aggravated assault in concert with two or more 
persons, without any requirement that the State 
establish each element of the gang enhancement 
statute beyond a reasonable doubt either at a trial 
at which the State would prove the criminal liabili-
ty of the others involved in the incident, or through 
guilty pleas to identical crimes by the others in-
volved in the incident, where defendant's guilty 
plea admitted every element of both the underly-
ing crime and the gang enhancement. Moench v. 
State, 2004, 88 P.3d 353, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 
2004 UT App 57. Sentencing And Punishment <£=> 
415 
11. Review 
Trial court lacked statutory authority to reduce 
by two degrees, without State's consent, first de-
gree aggravated robbery with gang enhancement 
to second degree offense without enhancement. 
State v. Barrett, 2005, 127 P.3d 682, 540 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 9, 2005 UT 88. Criminal Law <&=> 977(1) 
In order to be eligible for extraordinary relief, 
State was not required to show that trial court 
committed gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
by allegedly misapplying law governing reduction 
of offense when it reduced by two degrees charges 
for first degree felony with gang enhancement to 
second degree felony without enhancement without 
prosecutorial consent; rather, State was required 
to show only abuse of discretion, with egregious-
ness of error as merely one of several factors for 
Supreme Court to consider in granting relief; abro-
gating in State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 and Utah 
County v. Alexanderson, 71 P.3d 621. State v. 
Barrett, 2005, 127 P.3d 682, 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 
2005 UT 88. Courts <£=> 207.1 
§ 76-3-203.3. Penalty for hate crimes—Civil rights violation 
As used in this section: 
(1) "Primary offense" means those offenses provided in Subsection (4). 
(2)(a) A person who commits any primary offense with the intent to intimidate or terrorize 
another person or with reason to believe that his action would intimidate or terrorize that 
person is subject to Subsection (2)(b). 




Diagnostic evaluation which indicated that 
defendant was being considered for substance 
abuse program but was not serious about 
changing his behavior, together with defen-
dant's criminal record, provided sufficient basis 
for sentencing defendant to statutorily pre-
scribed period for burglary rather than placing 
him in substance abuse program. State v. 
Sweat, 1986, 722 P.2d 746. Sentencing And 
Punishment <&=> 323 
Trial court, in prosecution of defendant for 
burglary, did not abuse its discretion in not 
placing defendant on probation. U.C.A.1953, 
76-6-202. State v. McClendon, 1980, 611 P.2d 
728. Sentencing And Punishment <§=* 1844 
18. Review 
Burglary defendant, by requesting court-ap-
pointed counsel, waived right to claim that 
counsel was ineffective when she did not raise, 
either at trial or on appeal, contention that 
defendant was deprived of his right to self-
representation, as defendant's request for coun-
sel went beyond mere acquiescence and simple 
cooperation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; U.C.A. 
1953, 76-6-202(1). Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002, 
43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. 
Criminal Law §=* 1137(8) 
There was no reasonable likelihood that out-
come of trial in which defendant was convicted 
of third-degree felony burglary would have been 
different absent prosecutor's improper refer-
ences to alleged prior convictions of defendant 
other than three prior burglary felony convic-
tions to which he admitted, so as to justify 
reversal, where evidence of guilt was not mar-
ginal and court instructed that fact witness had 
been convicted of felony should be considered 
only in judging credibility of testimony but did 
not raise presumption that witness testified 
falsely, that statements of counsel were not evi-
dence to be considered, and that facts were to 
be determined from evidence, not from specula-
tion or conjecture. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. 
State v. Peterson, 1986, 722 P.2d 768. Crimi-
nal Law <£=> 1171.8(2) 
It would not be assumed that trial court, in 
nonjury prosecution for burglary and robbery, 
by not mentioning possible defense of diminish-
ed mental capacity, had not considered such 
defense. U.C.A. 1953, 76-6-202, 76-6-301. 
State v. Romero, 1984, 684 P.2d 643. Criminal 
Law ®» 260.11(2) 
In burglary prosecution, inference could be 
drawn by jury from defendant's unauthorized 
entry into darkened apartment by forcible 
means through bedroom window during late 
CRIMINAL CODE 
evening hours that defendant did so with an 
intent to commit theft, and thus trial court did 
not err in denying defendant's motion to reduce 
charge of burglary to criminal trespass and sub-
mitting issue to the jury. U.C.A.1953, 
76-6-201(3), 76-6-202(1). State v. Brooks, 
1981, 631 P.2d 878. Burglary <?=> 29 
Defendant accused of burglary and larceny 
could not complain that no one asked him to 
explain his possession of recently stolen proper-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 76-38-1. State v. Martinez, 
1968, 21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P.2d 943. Burglary 
<&* 42(4); Larceny <&=> 64(6) 
Record on appeal from burglary conviction 
failed to support defendant's claims of error in 
admitting victim's testimony as to identification 
of stolen items, as going to ultimate fact in 
issue, in refusing to give instruction as to re-
cently stolen property, or in denying defendant 
probation. State v. Brown, 1967, 19 Utah 2d 5, 
425 P.2d 405. Burglary ®» 34; Burglary <S» 
46(7); Sentencing And Punishment <&* 1890 
19. Post-conviction relief 
Postconviction relief petitioner was procedur-
ally barred from contending that burglary stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague and that he 
was denied the right of self-representation, as 
the issues were raised for the first time in the 
petition and he did not demonstrate an obvious 
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial 
of a constitutional right. U.C.A.1953, 
76-6-202(1). Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002, 43 
P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. 
Criminal Law <$=> 1429(1) 
Postconviction relief petitioner waived claim 
that counsel was ineffective by failing to chal-
lenge burglary statute on vagueness grounds; 
since petitioner filed his own briefs on direct 
appeal, he could and should have raised the 
issue himself at that time. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202(1). Rudolph 
v. Galetka, 2002, 43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. Criminal Law <&=> 1430 
Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, a peti-
tioner may raise the issues he failed to raise on 
direct appeal through an allegation of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal 
if he was represented by the same counsel dur-
ing both phases of the criminal proceedings, as 
it is unreasonable in such circumstances to ex-
pect counsel to raise on direct appeal the issue 
of his own ineffectiveness at trial. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202(1). Ru-
dolph v. Galetka, 2002, 43 P.3d 467, 439 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 2002 UT 7. Criminal Law <&> 
1440(3) 
§ 76—6-203. Aggravated burglary 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
32 
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Note 3 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any 
person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon' ' has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Body armor, increase of sentence if worn in violent felony, see § 76-3-203.7. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Enhanced penalty, certain offenses committed by prisoner, see § 76-3-203.6. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Habitual violent offenders, definition and penalties, see § 76-3-203.5. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Indigent Defense Act, see § 77-32-101 et seq. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Rights of Crime Victims Act, see § 77-38-1 et seq. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Serious youth offenders, charging procedure, see § 78-3a-602. 
L i b r a r y Re fe rences 
Burglary &*2 to 10. C.J.S. Burglary §§ 2 to 6, 11 to 22, 26 to 42. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 67k2 to 
67kl0. 
R e s e a r c h Re fe rences 
Treatises and Practice Aids 3 Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1, Burglary. 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 110, Property In- Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 7:32, At-
trusion and Destruction Offenses-Miscella- tempted burglary, burden of proof, 
neous Defenses. Wharton's Criminal Law § 331, In General. 
N o t e s of Dec i s ions 
Consent 2 required proof that defendant entered or re-
Double jeopardy 1 mained in building, and aggravated robbery re-
Effective assistance of counsel 4 quired proof that defendant took another's 
Elements of offense 3 property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Const. 
Instructions 8 Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(3), 
Judgment 11 76-6-203, 76-6-302. State v. Brooks, 1995, 
Lessor included offense 5 9 0 8 p - 2 d 8 5 6 - Double Jeopardy <£=> 145 
Presumptions and burden of proof 7 2 Consent 
Q . n Consent manifested by victim when he 
sentencing 1U opened door to defendant, who he believed had 
eyerance *> come to his house for lawful purpose, was limit-
Sufficiency of evidence 9
 e d t o t h a t p u r p o s e and did not, in context of 
charge of aggravated burglary, authorize defen-
1 Double iAnnar^v d a n t t o o r d e r victim out of house at gunpoint. 
. uouDiejeoparay U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202. State v. Bradley, 1985, 
Defendant s convictions for aggravated bur-
 ? 5 2 ?2d 874^ B l a r y ^ 1 5 
glary and aggravated robbery arising from 
same conduct did not constitute impermissible 3. Elements of offense 
multiple punishment and did not violate double Unlawful entry or remaining in building is not 




INSTRUCTION NO. %* 
To convict the defendant on Count 1, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY you must believe 
from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about January 1, 2006, 
2. in the State of Utah, 
3. the defendant, as a party to the offense, 
4. entered or remained unlawfully 
5. in a building or any portion of a building 
6. with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault on any person, 
7. and in the course of attempting, committing, or fleeing, 
8. the defendant or another participant in the crime: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the crime, 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any 
person who was not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use a dangerous weapon. 
If you find from all the evidence that each and every element of AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY, as explained in this instruction has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant guilty of this offense. However, if you find that one or more of the 
above elements have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In the event you find the defendant guilty on any of Counts 1 through 7, you will be 
asked to determine whether defendant committed any of those counts "in concert with two or 
more persons," which is defined below. If you find, from all the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted in concert with two or more persons, you will please 
make that finding on the verdict form where indicated. If you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in concert with two or more persons, you will please 
make that finding on the verdict form where indicated. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. "ASSAULT" 76-5-102(1) means: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
2. "BODILY INJURY95 76-1-601(3) means: 
physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
3. "BUILDING," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means: 
Any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
4. "CHILD" 76-5-109(l)(a) means: 
a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
5. "DANGEROUS WEAPON" 76-1-601(5) means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonable believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
6. A person "ENTERS OR REMAINS UNLAWFULLY" in or upon premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the 
public and when the actor is not otherwise Hcensed or privileged to enter or remain on the 
premises or such portion thereof. 
7. "ENTER" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) mtcvisloTi of any physical object \xadsc control of the actor 
8. "IN CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS" 76-3-203.1(b) and (4)(b) means: 
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the 
offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the other persons: 
(a) was physically present; or 
(b) participated as a party to any offense in 
(i) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, or 
(ii) burglary and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2. 
Other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the same 
offense or degree of offense as the defendant. And it is not necessary that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
6. "INTENTIONALLY" 76-2-103(1) means: 
Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. 
7. "KNOWINGLY" 76-2-103-(2) means: 
Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonabl^certain to cause the result. 
8. "PARTY TO THE OFFENSE": 76-2-202 means: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
9. "PHYSICAL INJTJRY" 76-5-109(l)(c) means: 
any injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other conduction of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; or 
(hi) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a 
serious physical injury. 
10. "SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY" 76-5-109(l)(d) means: 
any physical injury or set of injuries that: 
(A) seriously impairs the child's health; 
(B) involves physical torture; 
(C) causes serious emotional harm to the child; or 
(D) involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon, or 
(ii) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same 
person, either at the same time or on difference occasions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. IS 
In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of 
another, it is no defense that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has 
been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or 
of a different type or class of offense or is immune from prosecution. 
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